After reading the paper, I am still not very confused as to what the authors were arguing for. The different sub-headings seem independent from each other, which made their train of thought hard to follow. Often, I would find myself asking, “so how does that say about building an ontology of landforms?”
Before building such ontology, we as humans must first come to a clear understanding/philosophy of our relationship with our environment and the Earth. Although I am not sure if these terms can be equated, to me, primary theory sounds a lot like objectivism where things are deemed to exist upon being perceived and secondary theory sounds a lot of subjectivism where what exists depends on cultural believes and discourse. This dualistic way of understanding our relationship to nature is problematic. We cannot interpret our environment/space/geography as something that is external and separate from us when it is the very thing that allows us to experience ourselves. The French philosopher Merleau-Ponty has dedicated his life to constructing the Gestalt ontology. Naess has also extended this ontology in environmental philosophy. For me, the Gestalt ontology is the right direction we should be heading because it tries to marry the subjective-objective/mind-body duality in a way that the two views can remain distinct while remaining the same thing.
A gestalt “refers to a network of relationships whose various elements are mutually defining” (Diehm, 25). Gestalt is thus the smallest meaning chunk that we derive sense from. A good way to think about gestalt is by referring to a sculpture of a man holding a woman by Auguste Rodin. In one instance, the sculpture is called “Fugit Amor” and expresses the emotions of love, longing, and desire. In the second instance, the same sculpture appears on the door of “Dante’s Inferno” and expresses suffering and agony. Depending on the context and the meaning of the elements are changed completely.
I think an ontology of landforms should somehow encompass this way of relational thinking. Also, experience should be given the utmost importance because it is how we “know” the world and through it, how the world experiences itself (this is also way I like the idea of affordances). I would like to argue that the mountain does NOT exist before humans came along in the same way that it exists today after we have experience it because before experience a so called mountain is completely meaningless.
Diehm, C. (2006). Arne Naess and the Task of Gestalt Ontology. Environmental Ethics, 28(21-35). Retrieved on February 1st, 2012 from www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=439
-Ally_Nash
Outside of Barry Smith, most ontologists draw their definition from computational ontology and not directly from philosophy. The “nature of being” becomes “what is this thing?” Also, you need to explain please explain why you don’t think these types of ontologies don’t contain relationships. Believe me, they do.