Computers, Society, and Nature

In his lecture: Get Real about Geo-Engineering speaker Nigel Roulet posed the question: what level of climate change are we willing to accept, and what feasible mitigation options exist for curbing these changes? He discussed an array of potential geo-engineering solutions that ranged from carbon capture and storage to pumping aerosols into the atmosphere to increase albedo and reduce incoming solar radiation. By no means lacking in imagination, such proposed schemes deserve some consideration, however they should be approached critically and with caution.

As the public becomes increasingly aware of the potential impacts of climate change, a number of geo-engineering designs have emerged as prospective methods for mitigating climate change. Scientists and economists, like Nicolas Stern, have predicted that costs of climate change will be high, increasing with the degree of climate change. These costs include both environmental and economic costs as well as consequences for human health and potential loss of life. Recent attempts to achieve a global policy aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions have been halfhearted and unsuccessful. The attitude of world leaders going into the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen next month is disconcerting, indicating there may be little progress made on the nearly defunct Kyoto Protocol. As efforts to reduce our impact on the environment falter, many member of our society turn to their blind faith in technology to lead to a solution; figuring that if technology has lead us to this hole, it can certainly dig us out again. Moreover, to some individuals, such technological endeavors as a massive sunshade orbiting the earth are simply money-making schemes to exploit a budding market.

But before we jump on board, we must take into consideration the risks and long-term effectiveness of these high-tech proposals. The risks associated with solving a problem of massive perturbation to the global climate system by massively perturbing the global climate system, are simply too large. Due to the sheer scale of some of the more drastic climate change remedies, the effects on other elements or processes in the earth system are unknown. It must be noted, however, that not all geo-engineering strategies for dealing with climate change are risky. In fact, some proposed ideas, such as painting roofs white to reflect solar radiation, or reforestation and afforestation activities to expand global carbon sinks are ecologically benign, if not beneficial, but have a relatively low impact in terms of mitigating climate change.  The highly effective mitigation proposals are surrounded by the greatest amount of uncertainty, and decades worth of research are required before implementation can be considered. In addition to retarding progress on preventative policy, the geo-engineering solutions offer a short-term fix to the climate problem. These proposals fail to address mass consumption patterns, which are the underlying drivers of climate change and other forms of environmental degradation.  If technological solutions are successful at diminishing the dangerous impacts of climate change with no changes to human behaviour, the crisis will manifest itself in some other form of environmental stress. If action continues to be delayed, perhaps we will reach a point when the impacts of climate change become a reality, and in such desperation, turn to technology for a quick fix. But until then, we continue to deliberate on the subject of climate change and the geo-engineering designs remain, for now, in the realm of science fiction.

In the presentation of his paper, “Subsidiarity and environmental federalism: the emergence of ‘new governance’ in finfish aquaculture in Canada,” Prof Neil Craik discussed a number of issues around the legislation of finfish aquaculture in British Columbia. One aspect of particular importance was the question of subsidiarity. In his paper, he cites the Supreme Court of Canada’s definition of subsidiarity: “the proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity.” Prof Craik suggests that governance of resources and environmental management must be “democratic,” because there exists a diversity of values, and ultimately those affected by the regulations should be involved in the design of the regulations. This is in opposition to the British Columbia Supreme Court’s ruling that aquaculture should be federally regulated. At first glance, I agree with Prof Craik’s assessment: those best situated to protect a resource are those closest to it. This requires, however, some degree of alignment of values in regards to the management of the resource at hand. This lack of common values is quite apparent in the finfish aquaculture industry, which is, in Prof Craik’s words, “highly polarized,” with very little common ground between the advocates of the industry and its opponents. Subsidiarity also ignores non-verbal stakeholders, such as future generations. In addition, if salmon farms have an impact on wild salmon (which many argue they do), it seems appropriate that the federal government (DFO) have some say in their management, because management of wild salmon stocks happens at the federal level. In the case of wild salmon, the necessity of higher level management is brought about by the biology of the system itself; wild salmon know no borders, and therefore quotas must be streamlined with those of American fisheries agencies to achieve real, sustainable management.

My final concern is that current means of regulating the industry essentially eliminate the possibility of implementing adaptive management of salmon aquaculture off the BC coast. Adaptive management is difficult to incorporate into the current system because land leases are given out for 30 years at a time, to make development of aquaculture more economically viable. This seems to me to be a risky move in the management of a resource that is as notoriously complex as the west coast salmon fishery. Management needs to find ways of accommodating the science, not the other way around.

Recent emphasis on taking action against climate change and the demand for strong policy to reduce carbon emissions has lead many to question whether the efforts to develop a carbon market in recent years have been successful. Mark Purdon addressed this subject at the McGill School of the Environment Speaker Series, Is the Carbon Market Failing? The moral limits of climate change policy (October 23, 2009).  Two economic institutions have emerged from climate change policy, the cap and trade market and the carbon offset market. Mr. Purdon’s research focuses on the carbon offset market, and in particular clean development mechanisms (CDM); which are projects that are aimed to assist developed countries meet emissions reduction targets while facilitating the implementation of sustainable development strategies in developing countries. While his work is still in the preliminary stages of analysis, he found mixed results with regards to the success of the CDM projects; with the major uncertainty surrounding whether the carbon credits ascribed to the projects actually represent carbon emissions.

If the established carbon markets are indeed inefficient in achieving the objectives of reduced atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, we are in need of a much more stringent climate change mitigation policy. One such measure, which has been well discussed yet implemented by only a few governments, is a carbon tax. Policy-makers could set the level of acceptable green house gas emissions, based on the science of climate change, and adjust the price of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions accordingly. The tax should be designed to increase with time, to encourage companies to invest in renewable and other non-carbon energy sources. Governments must couple such a tax with investments in public transit and reductions in other forms of taxation, such as income tax and sales tax. Reforestation and land conservation could be rewarded by awarding tax credits to participants in these activities. The benefits of the carbon tax are clear, curbing behaviours away from the environmentally and socially damaging combustion of carbon-based fuels provide incentive for development and innovation in alternative and more fuel-efficient technologies. While perhaps less popular than the carbon offset markets from an industry perspective, I believe a strict taxation system is more likely to be effective mitigation strategy for climate change. 

The first of the 2009-10 MSE speakers series, September 25, explored problems and possible solutions in an open access fishery in eastern Africa. Profs Vaccaro, Chapman and Chapman have based their study around Nabugabo Lake, a satellite lake of Lake Victoria. The management problem at hand: how to regulate an inland fishery in which there are no clear boundaries of ownership, and “traditional” methods of enforcing fishing limits (such as quotas) do not appear to work. The tool already in place: beach management units (BMUs). This tool is designed to control access to fishing by controlling access to boat launching areas. It fails because it cannot control where boats go once they are in the water, and therefore cannot control where people are fishing. The aim of the presented project is to develop ecologically relevant, enforceable fishing boundaries within the lake which correspond with the BMUs already in place. In the best case scenario, they will find that there are discreet habitats within the lake that correspond with fish populations, which can then be divided into manageable units. This creates the necessary conditions for incentives to limit access to a particular part of the fishery, and to manage well that part, because these conditions of territoriality allow a link between management and benefits incurred by good management. This link is what is lacking when access is open.

This point about incentives is something that came up often during the talk and ensuing discussion period, as a key to the success or failure of the management program. There was debate from members of the audience over whether BMUs were the best way to manage this fishery. It was suggested that something simpler, such as limiting the number of boats on the lake, might be an easier way to manage it. However, a problem with this method of management is that it externalizes responsibility for enforcing the rules, rewarding those who break them by launching their boat from a hidden beach, or taking and hiding more than their share of the quota. In the worst case, it turns the fishery into a cat-and-mouse game between the people fishing and the people employed to enforce fisheries laws. Off the east coast of Canada, when the DFO tried to limit fish takes by limiting the length of fishing boats, people simply changed the design of their boats, building them deeper (in some cases resulting in maladaptive designs that led to accidents). When fisheries management depends solely on external enforcement, success depends on resources available (manpower and money) to enforce, resources that may not always be there. A community-based approach, on the other hand, seeks to internalize enforcement through creation of incentives for proper management within the management unit, elimination of free-riders, and enforcement of institutionalized boundaries. It links the task of managing a particular unit well with the benefits incurred by good management: ultimately, the users become the enforcers. 

Certainly, there are other aspects of community-based management that are necessary for success. Elinor Ostrom,  in “Designing complexity to govern complexity” (in Hanna and Munasinghe, Property Rights and the Environment, 1995), suggests that success depends also on methods of collective decision making, monitoring, graduated sanctions against members of the community who break the rules, mechanisms to resolve conflicts within the community of users, and recognition of the right of the community to manage the resource by the larger community (state), which is aided by a nesting of enterprises: management units within networks of management units, ultimately within the state or region.

The current study on Nabugabo Lake is intended as a case study. What is unclear to me is whether what is learned in this exercise can be scaled up to the much larger Lake Victoria, which is the ultimate ambition of this project. The question of scale is important in this case, because according to collective action theory, such management programs require that management units be small, and tend to fall apart when groups grow too large. And in the case of Lake Victoria, the problem is not simply that of size, but also international jurisdiction. The lake is shared by three countries, which may make enforcement of territories within the lake much more complex. However, success in managing Lake Nabugabo may go a long way toward building the case for international cooperation in implementing a similar management strategy in Lake Victoria.

While representing the model of integrative research in both natural and social sciences, the McGill School of the Environment Speaker Series seminar : Like herding fish: overfishing, free riders and reinventing collective action in Eastern Africa’s lakes, raises questions regarding the implementation of foreign ideologies towards resource management.

The seminar focused on the complexity of the social and ecological crisis of overfishing in the lakes of East Africa. From a biological perspective, humans have a massive impact on fish species populations, and the health of the lake ecosystems. Socially, many drivers including the political structure of the region, the economically lucrative export market and the nutritional needs of the local populations affect overfishing. This complex relationship of biological and social processes is unique to human ecology, and merits a multidisciplinary study. The research methods described by the speakers, including the collection of biologically relevant data on fish species abundance, population structure and habitat use, as well as the analysis of trade networks and interviews of fishermen about the size of their catches and their knowledge of the lakes, provides a framework for other human ecological studies.

The researchers asserted that the depletion of fish stocks in East African Lakes is a result of an open access resource system, in which no property rights are assigned.  Because there is no harvest limit or territorial boundaries, these systems are susceptible to overuse, as in the classic case of the Tragedy of the Commons. The current inland fisheries management system in East Africa is organized into small Beach Management Units (BMUs), which regulate the number of fishermen and the type of gear, but possess little authoritative power.

The speakers assumed that assigning exclusive fishing rights on sections of the lake to the BMUs would promote conservation and diminish over exploitation of the resource. Their assumption, which is founded upon the economic theories on property rights and collective action, yields the conclusion that the introduction of legal jurisdiction over an area of the lake will provide the incentive for the BMUs to actively patrol their boundary and punish the offenders.

What concerns me about this approach is the lack of cultural sensitivity. The concept of property rights and exclusive use is imbedded in Western ideology and culture. The speakers were unconvincing with regards to whether such a system would be accepted by the people of the region. I also question whether the transfer of this ideology to regulate fishing could have cultural ramifications in other aspects of East African society. Introducing territoriality could disrupt the social, political and economic relationships beyond the realm of fishing. Instead of solutions to overfishing being developed by foreign researchers, who adhere to a particular ideology, perhaps they should evolve from community-based initiatives within the affected region, such as brainstorming sessions of possible solutions between the fishermen and policy-makers. Because it would be designed by the creativity and experiences of local people, this type of solution is may be more likely to produce a sustainable and achievable outcome. 

Not the most inspiring title but this is just for you 650 students and all others interested to encourage you to get started with posting your comments about the seminars you attended.